McClellan and intelligence
21 March 2006
A recurring theme in the study of George McClellan’s record with the Army of the Potomac is his apparent propensity for overestimating the size and mettle of the opposing force. I really don’t have a good understanding of why this was or what his sources of information were. Except for a nodding acquaintance with Pinkerton (below), I don’t understand his intelligence apparatus at all.

I’m now reading Edwin Fishel’s The Secret War for the Union [more at Amazon], and I think there might be some help there. I have to admit I skipped ahead when I first got the book, Sunday last, looking for tidbits on the Maryland Campaign. Fishel has some very fine specifics on events of early September 1862 that I’d read of in summary elsewhere. I appreciate well documented details, though it doesn’t make for light reading in this case. Now that I’ve got a good feeling from the author in my small area of expertise, I’ll go back and begin at the beginning of the book. I promise.
Side note: I went to school and played music with a Fishel in the early 70’s in Arlington (Va). Great trumpet player. I knew his father, slightly, as a Dixieland bandleader and jazz musician. Had no idea he was a spook. Now I know “the rest of the story”.
There has been a discussion recently on H-CivWar about Antietam. About whether it was a draw or victory, and some of the common “what-ifs” have made their appearances: if only McClellan had insert cliches here … the usual suspects.
